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I. INTRODUCTION
It would be difficult to name a significant legal precept that has
been treated more cavalierly than standard of review. Some courts
invoke it talismanically to authenticate the rest of their opinions. Once
they state the standard, they then ignore it throughout their analysis of
the issues. Other courts use standard of review to create an illusion of
harmony between the appropriate result and the applicable law. If an
appellate court wants to reverse a lower tribunal, it characterizes the
issue as a mixed issue of law and fact, thereby allowing de novo review.
If the court wants to affirm, it characterizes the issue as one of fact or of
discretion. It then applies a higher (more deferential) standard to the
lower tribunal's decision. Finally, some courts disregard standard of
review in their analysis entirely.
Standard of review has been virtually ignored by legal scholars.1
The phrase does not even appear in any of the major law dictionaries.
Yet, as a concept, it is essential to every appellate court decision. It is to
the appellate court what the burden of proof is to the trial court. Ironi-
cally, although no trial judge would think of sending a case to the jury
without an instruction on the burden of proof, appellate judges often
omit the standard of review when they discuss whether or not to over-
rule a trial court's determination.
The one exception to the general lack of analysis in standard of
review lies in the area of administrative law. This exception is appar-
ently the result of a clumsy codification of common law principles.
Unfortunately, the discourse over administrative law has borne little
fruit. To quote Professor Kenneth Culp Davis: "Probably more than
500 pages a year are devoted to detailed statements about scope of
review of administrative action; most of that verbiage is harmless, for
neither the judges nor the readers of opinions take it seriously.
1. The one major work in the field is STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS,
FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (2d ed. 1992). This two volume work sets out the federal law
as it applies to various specific issues on review.
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Whether the verbiage about scope of review is helpful is doubtful, for it
is typically vague, abstract, uncertain, and conflicting."'
Despite Davis' assessment of the value of such analysis, this article
discusses standard of review. The discussion is not limited to review of
administrative actions, but rather covers standard of review as it is
applied to all lower tribunal findings.
This Article will define standard of review, trace its origins and
evolution, and discuss how the appropriate standard of review is deter-
mined. A brief discussion of each standard will follow the general dis-
cussion. Finally, suggestions will be made for analyzing standard of
review problems. The main point is that standards of review are and
should be flexible.3 Courts must recognize this and must look to the
policies behind a standard when they select and apply it in a particular
case.
II. DEFINITIONS
The terms "standard of review" and "scope of review" are often
used interchangeably. They will be used here as two separate concepts,
although they are interrelated and often confused.4 Scope of review is
often used in a way that includes both scope of review and standard of
review as those terms are defined in this article. The two, however,
should be distinguished. "Scope of review" best delineates the range
of issues which are subject to appellate review in a given case. It
answers the question: Can the issue be reviewed? The scope of appel-
late review for trial court decisions in Washington is governed by the
court rules;' in federal courts, it is governed by statute.6 "Standard of
2. 5 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:2 (2d ed. 1984). Davis
apparently heeded his own words. The 130 page chapter on "Scope of Review" in the second
edition of his treatise was condensed into a portion of a chapter of less than 40 pages on "Judicial
Review of Adjudications" in the third edition. See 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 11 (3d ed. 1994). Subsequent citations are to the
second edition.
3. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
4. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (3d ed. 1969). The first definition for "scope
of review" is correct: "The matters proper for consideration by an appellate court upon review of
a lower court decision." The second definition would be better placed under "standard of
review": "A variable in appellate practice, ranging from a trial de novo on appeal to a
determination of no more than the question whether there was substantial error producing a
miscarriage of justice in the trial court, the scope of review in the particular case depending upon
constitutional and statutory provisions." Id.
5. WASH. CT. R. App. P. 2.2-2.5, promulgated pursuant to authority of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 2.06.030 (1994). Review of administrative provisions is generally governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (1994) (formerly WASH. REv.
CODE § 34.04.130 (1987)).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291-1295 (1988). Administrative actions are reviewed pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1988).
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review," by contrast, operates only after an issue has been determined
to lie within the court's scope of review. Standard of review is based on
and defines how much deference the lower tribunal's decision will be
accorded. It answers the question: What is necessary to overturn the
decision? Typically, standards of review have been derived from com-
mon law although they may have later been codified, as the standards
contained in the Administrative Procedure Act have been.7
Precise definition of standard of review is virtually impossible,
because each standard evolved independently. As a result, different
standards measure different variables. Thus, while the burden of proof
can always be defined in terms of quantum (how much evidence is
necessary to establish a fact), no similar measure is common to all stan-
dards of review. Standards range from quantum ("substantial evi-
dence"), to point of view ("de novo"), to impression ("clearly
erroneous" and "arbitrary or capricious").
Furthermore, the different standards look to different components
of the decision-making process in their analysis. For instance, "sub-
stantial evidence" looks to the evidence in the lower tribunal's record in
support of the finding.' By contrast, "abuse of discretion" looks to the
decision-maker and his or her actions or inactions.9 "De novo" looks to
the appellate tribunal, describing how it can review the finding.1"
Finally, "clearly erroneous" and "arbitrary or capricious" look at the
overall big picture of what happened below, beyond the lower tribu-
nal's record.11
Because each standard examines different components, most stan-
dards cannot accurately be characterized as higher or lower than others.
Without doubt, some standards are broader than others (e.g., "clearly
erroneous" is a higher-more limiting-standard than "de novo").
However, a continuum of standards cannot be constructed. Therefore,
one question remains unanswered: Is a given standard exclusive and if
so, does a "higher standard" encompass a "lower standard"?' 2 Typi-
cally, courts apply a single standard to each issue to the exclusion of all
other standards.
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (1994); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
8. See State v. Galisia, 63 Wash. App. 833, 838, 822 P.2d 303, 306 (1992).
9. See, e.g., State v. Aguirra, 73 Wash. App. 682, 871 P.2d 616 (1994).
10. See Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittias County, 118 Wash. 2d 852, 854, 827 P.2d 1000, 1002
(1992).
11. Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d
267, 274, 552 P.2d 674, 678 (1976).
12. See Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L. J. 377, 404 (1984)
(stating that the "clearly erroneous" standard incorporates the "substantial evidence" standard
and citing cases in which the court uses a two-step analysis). The issue generally arises only in
administrative cases where the statute lists several standards.
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Within this context, the following will at least provide a working
definition: The standard of review is the criterion by which the decision of
a lower tribunal will be measured by a higher tribunal to determine its cor-
rectness or propriety.
One way to add understanding to this rather stark definition is to
study the origin and evolution of standard of review.
III. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
A. Common Law
Nothing that could properly be called an appeal was known at
early English common law before its fusion with equity in 1875.13
Instead, the remedy for a dissatisfied litigant was to bring an entirely
new action against the judge or jury in the original case.14 This so-
called "attaint" was a quasi-criminal procedure.1 S The focus of the
inquiry was on the decisionmakers' actions or inactions within the con-
text of the trial.16 If the decisionmakers had decided in error, they
would be punished according to the nature of their error. 17 Inciden-
tally, the verdict of the second tribunal was substituted for that of the
first.18
The writ of error ultimately replaced the writ of attaint.' 9 It, too,
was considered an entirely new proceeding, rather than a continuation
of a previous one. 20 The writ of error was an examination of the record
of the original proceedings by a second court. 21 By the mid-1700s, it
had become the primary means of reviewing a lower tribunal decision
at common law.22 The rules of pleading required that the challenged
13. 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 664 (2d ed. 1959).
14. See Edson R. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REV. 3, 7
(1940).
15. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMdON LAW 131
(5th ed. 1956).
16. See 2 Pollock, supra note 13, at 665.
17. Jurors of the first trial were convicted of perjury and were often heavily punished. A
resulting problem was that jurors of the attaint became increasingly unwilling to find the former
jury guilty. In time, courts adopted the method of granting new trials when the verdict was
unreasonable without punishing the jurors. See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 138-40 (1898). Attaint fell into disuse and was abolished
in 1825. 6 Geo. 4, ch. 50, § 60 (Eng.).
18. 2 POLLOCK, supra note 13, at 665.
19. See Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New
Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L. REv. 985, 986 (1989).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (6th ed. 1990).
21. HENRY J. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS
116-21 (1867).
22. 3 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 405
(1768).
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errors appear on the formal record of the case.23 Thus, the common
law knew nothing of review by rehearing a case.24
B. Early Development
The process of reviewing a case itself was first introduced into the
English court system by the Chancery courts. 2' This review (called an
appeal) took the form of a trial de novo complete with the taking of
testimony and other evidence.26
The dual system of law and equity, with its concomitant methods
for review, eventually found its way to the colonies. The colonies
adopted English procedural law to varying degrees.27 Generally, how-
ever, appellate review was performed in one of two ways: as a complete
trial de novo, 28 or as a review based on the record of the lower court.
29
This latter form of review derived from the writ of error used by the
English common law court.3" Conceptually, both the trial de novo and
the writ of error were considered new suits rather than continuations of
existing suits. 31 Therefore, there was no standard of review; there was
merely a burden of proof in a new case.
With time, appellate procedure in the colonies became uniform.
By the time of the Revolution, the writ of error had become the normal
appellate proceeding in the colonies.32 Even though colonial courts
began to recognize such an appeal as a continuation of the original
action, they did not formalize this recognition-they did not create new
mechanisms for it.
In adopting the Constitution, the federal government continued to
recognize the distinction between cases in law and cases in equity.33
Furthermore, the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 3' recognized the writ of
error as the appropriate vehicle for review of all cases at the federal
level.35 Thus, review by writ of error applied to equity suits as well as
23. 1 SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 214 (1956).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 214-15.
26. See 5 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 637 (1959).
27. See ROscOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 72 (1941).
28. Id.
29. ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2d ed. 1988).
30. See POUND, supra note 27, at 73.
31. See 3 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 12 (1915).
32. 5 POUND, supra note 26, at 630.
33. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
34. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
35. Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87.
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to suits at law.36 It was not until 1803 that review by writs of appeal in
equity was allowed in federal courts.37
One of the primary differences between the two methods of review
was the ability to review facts. Under the writ of error, factual determi-
nations were not subject to review.38 Under appeal, issues of fact as
well as those of law were subject to full review.39 This made sense in
an equity court because initially, all evidence in equity cases, including
testimony (via interrogatory or deposition), was placed into the rec-
ord.40 Evidence was not taken in open court as it was in cases at law.
The reviewing court was thus in the exact same position as the trial
court in determining facts. When later amendments to equity rules
allowed the taking of testimony in court,41 the appeals standard was not
modified to reflect the change. The result was that, even though the
rationale behind the difference in review no longer existed, the two
methods of review were not brought into alignment.
Over time, equity practice in America departed from the broad de
novo review of ancient chancery. While theoretically the review in
equity cases was still that of a rehearing or trial de novo, there had
36. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84-85. This provision was bitterly opposed by chancery lawyers as an
attack on the integrity of their own system. See Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of
Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 194 (1937).
37. Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244. The addition of the writ of appeal was a result
of a change in political power. The election of 1800 resulted in the overthrow of the Federalist
party and with it, Federalist control of the judicial process. Chancery lawyers had complained
about the limited review of facts under the writ of error and about Chief Justice Ellsworth's
interpretation of the Judiciary Act in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 320 (1796) (holding that
the statement of facts by a circuit court was conclusive in all cases brought under a writ of error).
Responding to these complaints, the new congress enacted legislation that ultimately led to the
revitalization of writs of appeal. See Clark & Stone, supra note 36, at 195-96.
38. 3 ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 496,
at 1969 (4th ed. 1909).
39. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENT AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 24-25 (1971).
40. Section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 abrogated the common law rule and provided for
oral testimony and examination in open court. In 1802, however, Congress returned to the former
system of allowing testimony of the witnesses to be taken by deposition. Act of April 29, 1802,
ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat. 156, 166. In 1842, when the United States adopted its equity rules, the
practice in suits in chancery generally was to put written questions to witnesses and take down the
answers in writing, and to certify, seal and file them in the court record. They were opened and
published only after all testimony had been taken. See I CHRISENBERRY L. BATES, FEDERAL
EQUITY PROCEDURE: A TREATISE ON THE PROCEDURE IN SUITS OF EQUITY IN THE CIRCUIT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES § 390, at 442 (1901).
41. Under Equity Rule 67, prior to its amendment in 1862, testimony could be taken by
written interrogatories, and, by agreement of parties, upon oral interrogatories. Under the rule as
amended, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 6 (1861), oral examination became the general rule with examination
by written interrogatories being the exception. Finally, in 1893, the Supreme Court amended
Equity Rule 67 to allow for taking of oral testimony in open court. Amendment to Rules, 149
U.S. 793 (1893).
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grown up certain well-settled and often-reiterated principles observed
by equity courts in considering findings of fact. 2 Deference was
accorded to most findings of fact at the trial level. This deference was a
logical result of allowing oral testimony at equity trials.4" Later, defer-
ence also reflected the acknowledged expertise of fact finders in the
new and growing administrative agencies. Ultimately, it was accepted
as a rule that trial court findings, although not conclusive, had great
weight with the appellate court. That "great weight" was codified as
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52 when the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were adopted.4
C. Modern Practice
In 1928, Congress abolished the writ of error in federal appeals
and substituted the appeal.45 However, the abolition turned out to be
an act more of form than of substance (at least in terms of standard of
review). It did not change the different standards of review in law cases
and equity cases.46 That distinction did not disappear until 1938, when
law and equity were merged with the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.47 By 1938, an appeal was recognized for what it really
was: a review of an existing case, rather than a new case. The new
Federal Rules treated it as such. Rule 52(a) stated: "In all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury ...[f]indings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
42. Clark & Stone, supra note 36, at 207. Although these principles were not codified by
statute or rule, they were commonly noted by the courts. See William W. Blume, Review of Facts
in Non-Jury Cases: Proposed Federal Rule 68, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 68, 71 (1936).
43. Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter believed that the requirement of special findings of
fact in equity cases, emphasized since a 1930 amendment to the equity rules, led automatically to a
restriction on the standard of review. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 (1930).
44. See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] § 2571 (1971).
45. Act of Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, 45 Stat. 54, amended by Act of Apr. 26, 1928, ch. 440, 45
Stat. 466. Abolition of the writ of error was the result of several years worth of activity by the bar.
By the 1920s, the writ had been abolished in many states and replaced by a simpler practice of
appeal by notice. The American Bar Association's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform
recommended that writs of error be abolished in 1921. The Committee was of the opinion that
there was no good reason for retaining the complex and cumbrous machinery for review in federal
courts. Even so, it took legislation several years to come to fruition. See Philip M. Payne, The
Abolition of Writs of Error in the Federal Courts, 15 VA. L. REv. 305 (1929).
46. JAMES W. MooRE, MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 73.01 (1938). See also Clark & Stone, supra note 36, at 205.
47. 302 U.S. 783 (1937).
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nesses." 48  Findings of fact by a jury were protected by the Seventh
Amendment and thus continued to be reviewed only as they had been
at common law.49 Issues of law continued to be reviewed de novo.
50
In contrast to the federal government, the State of Washington
never recognized a distinction between law and equity."1 Review stan-
dards in the state, therefore, have always been drawn along the lines of
the law/fact distinction.
Before analyzing the law/fact distinction, however, a short discus-
sion of reasons for deferring to lower tribunal determinations is in
order.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR DEFERENCE TO LOWER TRIBUNAL
DECISIONS
Many reasons are given for deferring to decisions of lower tribu-
nals. Some are more persuasive than others. The first group of reasons
focuses on the judicial system and what such deference does for the
system itself. The first reason asserted is finality. The more deference
given to the decision of the lower tribunal, the less likely the losing
party is to appeal that decision. Regardless of the outcome, parties will
at least have the satisfaction of knowing that the issue has been deter-
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1938), reprinted in MooRE, supra note 46, at 3115 (emphasis
added). The provision of Rule 52(a) that findings of fact not be set aside unless "clearly
erroneous" represented a statement of what was considered to be the federal equity practice in the
years just prior to the merger of law and equity. The Advisory Committee deemed it desirable to
have a single standard of review for all actions tried before the court, whether historically legal or
equitable. The majority of the Committee preferred the broader equity review to the narrower
review at law. 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 44, § 2571, at 680-81.
49. The standard at common law was that the facts as found and stated by the court below
were conclusive on review. In addition, review of cases with special findings extended only to a
determination of whether the facts as found were sufficient to support the judgment, but not to
whether the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. Dooley v. Pease, 180 U.S.
126, 131 (1901).
50. See 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 44, § 2588, and cases cited
therein.
51. [AIIl common law forms of action, and all distinctions between law and equity are
hereby abolished, and hereafter there shall be in this territory but one form of action, to
establish and enforce private rights, which shall be called a civil action.
An Act Regulating the Practice and Proceedings in Civil Action, ch. 1, § 1, 1854 Wash. Laws 131
(passed Apr. 28, 1854). This provision may have passed as a matter of administrative conven-
ience. Such a rationale is supported by court interpretations after the fact. Courts have said that
although the provisions abolished the distinct pleading forms of law and equity, the substance
beneath the forms remains. Thus, actions that would have been brought in different courts under
either law or equity are administered by the same courts and judges. Still, some of the rules
governing the different branches of action remain distinct. See State ex rel. Northeast Tranap. Co.
v. Superior Ct. of King County, 194 Wash. 262, 77 P.2d 1012 (1938). Considering the sparse
population of the Territory at the time of the provision's enactment, a single court for all actions
would be a logical creation.
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mined, and they can move on with their lives. The second reason given
is a reduction of court congestion. If fewer parties appeal, there will be
fewer appellate cases. This results in a reduction in the backlog of the
appellate docket. A final institutional reason for deferring to lower
tribunals is to maintain the morale of trial court and administrative law
judges. Certainly no judge likes to be reversed. However, as a ration-
ale for deferring to a decision, this reason is in itself terribly lacking. A
better one, perhaps, is that a high proportion of reversals on review
erodes public confidence in trial courts. However, none of the above
rationales helps to determine which decisions should be given
deference.5 2
A second group of reasons for deferring to lower tribunal decisions
helps specify which decisions should be accorded more deference.
These reasons focus on the specific decision. Typically, the stated
rationale for giving deference to the decision of a lower tribunal is that
the decision-maker was in a better position to make findings on the
issue.5 3 These decision-makers are present throughout the entire
course of the trial. They can observe first-hand the demeanor of each
witness and thereby determine each witness' credibility. They spend
more time with the facts and parties of the case so they generally have a
better understanding of the context within which an issue arises. A
second rationale for deference is preserving the sanctity of jury trials.
Jury decisions have always been considered sacred in American juris-
prudence. 4 Juries protect parties from compliant, biased, or eccentric
judges.55 Unless their decisions are given deference at the appellate
stages, the right to jury trial will be an empty one, protecting only
against trial judges, who might not make the ultimate determination.
Under the third stated rationale, administrative tribunals are often
deferred to because of their expertise on the subject matter over which
they administer laws. 6 Some courts have also said that trial judges
develop expertise at making inferences from testimony and evidence
because it is a function they perform all the time. 7
The latter group of policy reasons for giving deference may be
more applicable to some decisions than to others. For example, the
facts found at an administrative hearing with numerous expert wit-
nesses have more reasons to be deferred to than those found by a judge
52. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 660-62 (1971).
53. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413 n.9 (1980).
54. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
55. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
56. 5 DAvis, supra note 2, § 29.16, at 399.
57. See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, 882 F.2d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1989).
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when all the evidence is documentary. Because of this, it can be argued
that a single standard can be applied differently to different cases on
review."'
Courts, however, do not initially look to policy in determining the
standard of review. Instead, they have traditionally begun their analy-
sis with characterization. Following suit, this Article does the same.
V. CHARACTERIZATION
Legal issues have traditionally been classified as issues of law,
issues of fact, or mixed issues of law and fact. A variety of judicial
results stems from the way in which an issue is characterized. The
characterization of an issue can therefore be critical to an attorney.
A. Distinction Between Law and Fact
The debate on what constitutes an issue of fact and what consti-
tutes an issue of law has been going on in this country for over a cen-
tury.59 The distinction is commonly used to determine whether the
judge or jury will decide an issue at trial.60 It is also critical to the
standard of review. Both federal and Washington courts have held that
the determination of the proper standard of review hinges on whether
the question presented for review is one of fact, one of law, or a hybrid
of fact and law.61
One major commentator states that the difference between an
issue of law and an issue of fact is only one of degree, that the relation-
ship between fact and law can be described as a spectrum with finding
of fact shading imperceptibly into conclusion of law. 62 Another meta-
58. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources
of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 645 (1988).
59. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 138 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting). The roots of
the debate seem to stem as far back as the Magna Charta. Id. at 114.
60. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.44.080 (1994) states all questions of law are to be decided by the
court. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.44.090 (1994) states all questions of fact are to be decided by the
jury. The latter statute is obviously intended to apply only to cases that are tried by jury rather
than to the court. State ex tel. Dept. of Ecology v. Anderson, 94 Wash. 2d 727, 732, 620 P.2d 76,
78 (1980). Although not codified, the federal rule is the same. See United States v. Johnson, 718
F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1983).
61. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 286 n.16 (1982) (citing Baumgartner v.
United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)); Devine v. Employment Security, 26 Wash. App. 778,
781, 614 P.2d 231, 233 (1980).
62. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 239, 240 (1955).
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phor might be to say the distinction is the legal "devil's pitchfork. 63
At each end of the spectrum, there is clarity. That is, some findings
are indisputably findings of fact, while others are indisputably state-
ments of law. This leads to the illusion that a given issue should be
definable as either one or the other. However, when the two begin to
merge in what has been called "ultimate fact," "application of law to
facts," or "mixed question of law and fact," applying the available defi-
nitions and appropriate standards becomes problematic.
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court observed that it did not
yet know of any rule or principle that would unerringly distinguish a
factual finding from a legal conclusion.64 Some guidelines can be
established, however. Where courts perceive the inquiry as empiri-
cal-revolving around actual events, past or future-the inquiry is
labeled a question of fact; where the issue is primarily policy-center-
ing on the values society wishes to promote-it becomes one of law. 6s
A question of law has also been defined as an issue that involves the
63.
64. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
65. Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 TEx. L.
REv. 157, 179 (1985).
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application or interpretation of a law.66 Of course, at some point these
distinctions meet and overlap, and any attempt at definitively classify-
ing the issues runs aground. Still, courts have traditionally attempted
to select the standard of review based on their classification of the issue
(although one suspects that some courts make their decision the other
way around even if they do not say so).
Washington courts have said that when a determination is made
about evidence showing that something occurred or existed, it is a find-
ing of fact, but, when the determination is made by a process of legal
reasoning from facts in evidence, it is a conclusion of law. 67 These
courts have also stated that a finding of fact is an assertion that a phe-
nomenon has happened or is or will happen independent of or anterior
to any assertion about its legal effect.68 These courts are really saying
that any legal analysis makes the finding a mixed issue of law and fact.
The problem is that in classifying an issue as either one of law or a
mixed question, the standard of review is usually de novo. This allows
an appellate court carte blanche even though there may be reasons for
deferring to the lower tribunal. When an issue falls within the blurred
area of a mixed question, it might be better to fall back on policy con-
siderations. Parties could argue why a certain standard was appropriate
for the situation and how it should be applied in the particular case.
One final note: A lower tribunal's determination of an issue as
one of fact or law does not bind an appellate court.69 That is to say, the
characterization of an issue is itself an issue of law. There is no testi-
mony, special expertise, or other reason for deferring to a trial court's
finding on the issue.
B. Discretionary Functions
Courts ignore the fact/law distinction in determining the standard
of review for procedural and evidentiary questions. Certainly a trial
judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence cannot be characterized
as a question of fact. It is probably best characterized as one of law.
However, reviewing courts have not attempted to characterize such
decisions as law or fact. Instead, they classify them simply as matters
of discretion.7 ° Courts have not explained why the philosophical
underpinnings for the standard of review on these issues differs from
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1246 (6th ed. 1990).
67. State v. Niedergang, 43 Wash. App. 656, 658-59, 719 P.2d 576, 577 (1986).
68. Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n., 84 Wash. 2d 271, 283, 525
P.2d 774, 783 (1974) (this definition was originally put forth in Jaffe, supra note 62, at 241).
69. Local 1296, International Ass'n. of Firefighters v. Kennwick, 86 Wash. 2d 156, 162, 542
P.2d 1252, 1256 (1975).
70. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 75 Wash. App. 278, 283, 877 P.2d 252, 255 (1994).
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the typical analysis. The best explanation seems that a judge makes so
many of these determinations during litigation that allowing de novo
review (as is typical for issues of law) would congest the appellate court
system. Rather than allowing such review and limiting reversals by
asserting harmless error, the courts limit the review itself by applying a
more deferential standard.
VI. APPELLATE REVIEW OF PARTICULAR DECISIONS
A. Review of Findings of Fact
Review of fact-finding in federal court is sometimes governed by
court rule, other times by common law. Civil Rule 52(a) requires facts
found by the court to be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous"
standard.7 Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have no
provision similar to Rule 52(a), the Supreme Court has said that the
considerations underlying that rule apply with full force in a criminal
context.7 2 Accordingly, the "clearly erroneous" standard of review has
long been applied to non-guilt findings of fact by district courts in
criminal cases. 3 Facts found by a jury are reviewed with the common
law "substantial evidence" test.74 The sanctity of the Constitutional
right to jury trial is the justification given for this enhanced
deference.7"
In Washington, as a rule, all findings of fact are reviewed under
the substantial evidence test. This test has been adopted through a
process of gradual evolution. 76 From 1893 to 1951, there was de novo
review of evidence in nonjury cases. 77 During the fifties, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court started asking whether the evidence preponderated
against the findings.7 Finally, the substantial evidence test was enun-
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
72. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986).
73. See id.; 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 374, at 315-16
(2d ed. 1982).
74. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). See also 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 44, § 2585, at 730.
75. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; WAsH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
76. See Philip A. Trautman, Motions Testing Suffciency of Evidence, 42 WAsH. L. REv. 787,
803 n.65 (1967).
77. See Crofton v. Bargreen, 53 Wash. 2d 243, 254, 332 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1958) (Foster, J.
dissenting).
78. Trautman, supra note 76, at 803 n.65 (citing Johnson v. Harvey, 44 Wash. 2d 455, 268
P.2d 662 (1954)).
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ciated in Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards.79 Since then, it has been
recognized as the appropriate standard."0
B. Exceptions to General Rules in Fact-Finding
Both Washington and federal courts have made exceptions to the
general rules for reviewing findings of fact. In Washington, if the facts
are undisputed, the reviewing court stands in the same position as the
trial court and can therefore apply the de novo standard." The same is
true for decisions based on evidence which is exclusively documen-
tary. 2 Because some federal circuits had similar holdings, 3 the U.S.
Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1985
to provide specifically: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or docu-
mentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ...84
Washington has also created an exception for reviewing trial court
findings when constitutional rights are at issue.8s In such cases, they
require an independent evaluation of the evidence (de novo review).
Federal Courts, like the Washington courts, have made an excep-
tion to the usual standard of review for factual questions when a "con-
stitutional fact" is involved.8 6 A constitutional fact is defined as a fact
whose determination will decide an issue of constitutional rights.8 7 In
such instances the appellate court applies a de novo review to the consti-
tutional facts (as opposed to all the facts).
There is some question as to whether de novo review extends to all
constitutional questions, or just to certain ones, such as those that
79. 54 Wash. 2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Prior to Thorndike, Washington courts had
conducted de novo review pursuant to Act of 1893, ch. 61, § 21, 1893 Wash. Laws 130. The
statute was abrogated by the court under its rule-making power, Rule 65, WASH. RULE ON
APPEAL 65, reported in Amendments of Rules on Appeal, 47 Wash. 2d xvii, xx-xxi (effective Jan.
3, 1956), and later repealed by the legislature. "Substantial evidence" was the test used before the
1893 statute that made review de novo. However, that test was based on a territorial statute that
had since been repealed and should not, therefore, have been relied upon. Thorndike and
subsequent cases ignored the basis for the decision and applied that test. It has since become an
accepted standard.
80. See, e.g., Pope v. University of Wash., 121 Wash. 2d 479, 490, 852 P.2d 1055, 1062
(1993); Bell v. Hegewald, 95 Wash. 2d 686, 688, 628, P.2d 1305, 1306 (1981).
81. Peeples v. Port of Bellingham, 93 Wash. 2d 766, 613 P.2d 1128 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wash. 2d 853, 861 n.2, 676 P.2d 431, 436 n.2 (1989).
82. Wilson v. Howard, S Wash. App. 169, 486 P.2d 1172 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
85. State v, Byers, 85 Wash. 2d 783, 786, 539 P.2d 833, 835 (1975) (probable cause), rev'd on
other grounds, State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 554 P.2d 1334 (1977).
86. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 508 n,2 7 (1984)
(quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 54 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
87. New Jersey Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797 F.2d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1986).
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involve the First Amendment."8 The United States Supreme Court has
not dealt with the issue. Washington courts have applied de novo
review to defamation cases and criminal proceedings.8 9 The issue does
not appear to have been raised in any other civil situations. Nor has the
Washington Supreme Court indicated whether or not it would apply
such exceptions to factual determinations of constitutional right under
the state constitution.
Actually, any constitutional "fact" is more truly characterized as a
mixed issue of law and fact which normally receives de novo review,
anyway. The constitutional fact doctrine, however, does allow de novo
review of jury findings as well as bench findings if a constitutional
issue is involved.90 This is not true of jury findings on mixed issues
that are not of constitutional magnitude. Thus, a jury finding of actual
malice in a defamation action (based on the First Amendment) is
reviewed differently from a jury finding of negligence (not constitu-
tionally protected).
C. Review of Fact-Finding by Administrative Tribunals
Review of fact-findings by administrative tribunals is governed by
statute: the Administrative Procedure Act.91 Administrative facts are
reviewed at the federal level under the "substantial evidence" test 92
unless some other standard of fact review is specified by statute.
Under the original Washington Administrative Procedure Act, "sub-
stantial evidence" was also the standard of review. 93 However, that test
was replaced in 1967 by the "clearly erroneous" test. 4 In 1988, Wash-
ington returned to the "substantial evidence" test in reviewing admin-
istrative fact findings.9"
88. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 264-76
(1985).
89. See Miller v. Argus Pub. Co., 79 Wash. 2d 816, 829, 490 P.2d 101, 110 (1971) (citing
Rosenbloom), overruled on other grounds by Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439,
546 P.2d 81 (1976); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 616 P.2d 649 (1980) (and cases cited
therein).
90. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Mushkin, 12 Wash. App. 56, 527 P.2d 1393 (1974).
91. The review provisions of the federal Administrative Procedure Act can be found at 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Those in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act can be found at
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (1994).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
93. Administrative Procedure, ch. 234, § 13(6)(e), 1959 Wash. Laws 1088.
94. Administrative Rules and Procedure, ch. 237, § 6(6)(e), 1967 Wash. Laws 1218 (codified
at WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1987)).
95. Sunset Revisions-Administrative Procedure Act Revised, ch. 288, § 516, 1988 Wash.
Laws 1386 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.5 7 0(3)(e) (1994)). One commentator suggests
that the rationale for returning to the "substantial evidence" test was its familiarity (being the
standard for factual review of agency decisions under the federal APA and the standard for factual
review of non-administrative decisions in Washington). William R. Andersen, The 1988
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D. Review of Issues of Law
Judicial review of issues of law is straightforward. The standard is
always de novo.96 There are no exceptions. Courts may say that defer-
ence is given to an agency's interpretation of a statute.97 In other
words, deference will be given to the manner in which the agency
applies the law. Even though phrased as an issue of law, such a ques-
tion is really one of mixed law and fact.
E. Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
Mixed questions of law and fact, or application issues, involve the
comparison or bringing together of the correct law and the correct facts
with a view to determining the legal consequences.98
1. Federal Review of Mixed Questions
There are two standards of review for mixed questions of law and
fact at the federal level. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
while it usually reviews mixed questions independently, its precedents
are not entirely consistent and there is support in its decisions for
"clearly erroneous" review of some mixed questions.99 The Ninth Cir-
cuit has elaborated on this by stating that the appropriate standard
should be determined by reference to the sound principles that underlie
appellate review.' 00 That court has also said that the appropriate stan-
dard of review turns on whether factual matters or legal matters
predominate.' 0 1 If an inquiry is essentially factual, or it properly relies
on the District Court's discretion, then the Court of Appeals gives def-
Washington Administrative Procedure Act-An Introduction, 64 WAsH. L. REV. 781, 838 (1989).
Professor Andersen says that the Washington courts appeared uncertain about the purpose of the
1972 change and its application. Id.
96. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
98. Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 329-30, 646 P.2d 113, 119 (1982).
99. Cf. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984); Pullman-Standard
v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90 (1982) (particularly n.19). The Supreme Court's approach is not
inconsistent if the Court recognizes that application of standards is flexible and should be based
on policy considerations. Policy reasons may have called for more deference to one mixed
question than to another. Thus, the Court can be consistent and yet use different standards for
the same type of issue or apply the same standard differently.
100. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984). The court said: "If
the concerns of judicial administration-efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight-make it
more appropriate for a district judge to determine whether the established facts fall within the
relevant legal definition, we should subject his determination to deferential, clearly erroneous
review. If, on the other hand, the concerns of judicial administration favor the appellate court, we
should subject the district judge's finding to de novo review. Thus, in each case, the pivotal
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erence to the decision of the District Court.11 2 Otherwise the Court of
Appeals conducts de novo review. 10 3 Concerns for judicial administra-
tion will generally lead an appellate court to justify de novo review. 0 4
Although the test calls for looking to the policy behind review for
determining the amount of deference, the test itself is either/or. That
is, review will either be "clearly erroneous" or de novo even though a
policy analysis might dictate an amount of deference somewhere in
between.
2. Washington State Review of Mixed Questions
The Washington Supreme Court has said that it is not the prov-
ince of the reviewing court to try the facts de novo when presented with
mixed questions of law and fact that are on appeal from a judgment of a
superior court, administrative tribunal, or administrative judge.OS Yet
the court's stated standard for mixed questions of law and fact is de
novo. 1 0 6 The solution to this apparent paradox is in bifurcation. What
is reviewed de novo in a mixed question is the meaning of the law and
how it applies to facts as determined by the trier of fact; the court does
not reweigh evidence of credibility or demeanor.10 7 In other words,
historical facts receive deference but the statement of the law and the
application of that law to the historical facts (to determine ultimate
facts) is reviewed de novo. This proposition, however, does not hold
true when an appellate court reviews a jury decision. To allow de novo
review would totally eviscerate the right to a jury trial.
F. Review of Jury Findings
A major problem in reviewing jury decisions is that juries do not
ordinarily make specific findings of fact. While a judge is required to
make written findings of fact and conclusions of law,10 ' juries typically
make only legal conclusions. In a criminal case, the jury usually just
checks off on a form whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty. In
a civil case, it determines whether, for example, the defendant was neg-
ligent and if so, how much he or she should pay in damages. A review-
102. United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 484
U.S. 554 (1987).
103. Id.
104. Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
105. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d at 330, 646 P.2d at 119-20.
106. See Rasmussen v. Employment Sec., 98 Wash. 2d 846, 849-50, 658 P.2d 1240, 1242
(1983).
107. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d at 330, 646 P.2d at 119.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); WAsH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 52(a)(1); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM.
R. 6.1(d). But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) (which does not require specific findings unless
requested before a general finding is made).
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ing court does not know what evidence the jurors found credible. The
court cannot know what historical facts the jury found and cannot
determine whether or not the jury erroneously applied the law to these
facts. If the law was stated correctly in the jury instructions, then, the
court's power to review is virtually nonexistent even if it is character-
ized as de novo. Thus, courts typically review jury findings under the
"substantial evidence" standard. 109
Courts might find it easier to conduct meaningful review if attor-
neys utilized special verdict forms." 0 An attorney could ask the jury to
determine whether or not the defendant committed a specific act or
knew a particular fact. These historical facts would be given the great
deference due to jury fact-finding. The jury's legal conclusion, how-
ever, that such an act or knowledge constituted guilt or negligence
could be reviewed less deferentially without violating the sanctity of the
right to a jury trial.
The way courts analyze standard of review for mixed questions is
particularly ripe for change. As seen above, courts have made conflict-
ing statements in trying to define a consistent standard for mixed ques-
tions. It would be more practical for them to acknowledge that
different mixed questions should be treated differently. Instead of try-
ing to force questions into rigid categories, a court should turn to policy
analysis.
Mixed questions exist on a continuum; therefore, rigid application
of standards is inappropriate. Courts should analyze the reasons for
giving deference in each particular case and review the decision accord-
ingly. This may, in fact, be what some courts are doing, but they do
not acknowledge the process. It would be better if they did.
G. Review of Procedural/Evidentiary Questions
For certain questions, courts totally ignore the fact/law distinction
in determining the appropriate standard of review. These are issues of
trial procedure-including questions about courtroom conduct and
admissibility of evidence. The reason for deferring to lower courts'
views of these questions is largely one of judicial economy. A judge
may make hundreds of determinations in a single case before and dur-
ing the course of a trial. To deter parties from appealing every adverse
decision, statutes and court rules have given judges wide discretion to
make everyday types of decisions.' 1 ' Therefore the standard of review
109. State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 407, 717 P.2d 722, 728 (1986).
110. See FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 49(a).
111. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 611; WASH. R. EVID. 611. The word "may" usually implies
some degree of discretion. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983).
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for these questions is "abuse of discretion." It will be discussed later in
this Article.
The evolution of "abuse of discretion" exemplifies the haphazard
manner in which some standards of review have developed. Because
early writs for judicial review encompassed discretionary matters, a trial
court's decision on such matters was considered final. In 1892, Justice
Brown stated: "The general principle is too well settled to admit of
doubt that where action of an inferior tribunal is discretionary its deci-
sion is final."'1 12
Once the rigidity of the procedures for review by writ relaxed,
however, the rationale for not reviewing such matters no longer existed.
The key stroke appears to have been made in 1892. In the same term
that Earnshaw said the trial court's decision was final, the Supreme
Court also stated: "The question ...is ordinarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and in the present case no abuse of
that discretion is shown."' 1 3
Three years later, the Court said that the proposition that a matter
of discretion was not subject to review, "unless it be clearly shown that
such discretion has been abused, is settled by too many authorities to
be now open to question." '114 Thus, in less than five years, the stan-
dard for reviewing discretionary decisions was changed, a new standard
was created, and nobody even seemed to notice.
H. Review of Administrative Decisions...
Administrative decisions present unique issues in standard of
review. While standard of review generally evolved with the common
law, administrative review is a creature of statute. The statutes, how-
ever, were created with an eye to judicial review of court determina-
tions. Therefore, cases concerning judicial review of administrative
acts prior to passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and those
concerning judicial review of court determinations can be helpful in
interpretation.' 1 6
112. Earnshaw v. United States, 146 U.S. 60, 68 (1892) (and cases cited therein).
113. Means v. Bank of Randall, 146 U.S. 620, 629 (1892).
114. Isaacs v. United States, 159 U.S. 487, 489 (1895) (citing both Earnshaw and Means,
among others, as authority for the proposition).
115. For a more detailed discussion of judicial review of agency actions in Washington, see
Tim J. Filer, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in Washington Revisited-Doctrine,
Analysis, and Proposed Revisions, 60 WASii. L. REv. 653 (1985); Harlan S. Abrahams, Scope of
Review of Administrative Action in Washington: A Proposal, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 75 (1978); William
R. Andersen, Judicial Review of Agency Fact-Finding in Washington: A Brief Comment, 13
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 397 (1977).
116. According to Tom C. Clark, the Attorney General at the time of the Act's adoption, the
Act merely "restates the law governing judicial review of administrative action." S. REP. No. 752,
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As stated above, judicial review of administrative decisions is gen-
erally governed by statute at both federal""' and state11 levels. In
addition to the general review provisions in the administrative proce-
dure acts, there may also be specific review statutes for particular
agencies.119
Typically, statutory judicial review provisions for administrative
acts are veritable laundry lists of standards. Determination of how the
standards should be applied is left for the courts. In response, courts
have followed the traditional fact/law/procedure distinction.
1. Federal Review of Administrative Actions
Judicial review of administrative actions at the federal level
depends largely on whether the agency action is formal or informal. As
in other areas, federal courts decide questions of law de novo in review-
ing administrative agency actions. 120 Factual questions that stem from
formal rulemakings 12' and formal adjudications"' are reviewed under
the "substantial evidence" test. 123 When an agency takes informal
action, the reviewing court decides whether or not its factual determi-
nations were arbitrary or capricious. 124 Additionally, all agency actions
are reviewable for abuse of discretion.1 2
5
2. Washington Review of Administrative Actions
The new Washington Administrative Procedure Act distinguishes
among rulemaking, administrative orders, and "other agency actions"
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1945) (Appendix B), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 79TH CONGRESS 1944-46 at 224 (1946). See also United States v.
Wiley's Cove Ranch, 295 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1961) (stating that the "Administrative
Procedure Act did not change the common law ... but rather codified it.")
117. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (1994) (formerly WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130
(1987)).
119. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 755 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.16.150(1) (1994). The new
Washington APA excludes certain agencies like the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals from
its judicial review provisions. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030 (1994); see also
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.030(2)(a) (1994).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
121. Id. §§ 553, 556.
122. Id. §§ 554, 556.
123. Id. § 706(2)(E).
124. Id. § 706(2)(A); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-15
(1971). The arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable to formal rulemakings and
adjudications as well. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.3, at
357 (1985); Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 20 UCLA L. REv. 899, 934 (1973).
125. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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in defining the standard of review. 126 It creates a newly phrased stan-
dard for reviewing agency rulemaking. A rule can be invalid not only
for unconstitutionality, exceeding an agency's statutory authority, and
procedural irregularities, but also if it "could not conceivably have been
the product of a rational decision-maker. ' 127  This standard is sup-
posed to be distinguishable from the more traditional "arbitrary or
capricious" standard. 128 More likely, it will add to the current muddle.
For review of agency orders, the statute continues to list a variety
of standards against which the agency's action will be measured. 129
Other agency actions are reviewed under a new provision setting out a
more limited set of standards. 130
The 1988 revisions to the Administrative Procedure Act make
Washington's law conform more closely to the federal law. Prior to
passage of the new Act, the standard of review for administrative deci-
sions differed with the type of proceeding and the manner in which
review was sought. The standard for contested cases was either de
131 " 132 "13novo, "clearly erroneous", or "arbitrary or capricious, 1 33 depend-
ing on the appellant's grounds for challenging the agency's action.
126. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570 (1994).
127. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(C) (1994).
128. See Andersen, supra note 195, at 835.
129. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(3) (1994), an order is invalid if it is:
(a) in violation of the Constitution,
(b) outside the agency's authority,
(c) the product of invalid procedure,
(d) based on an erroneous interpretation or application of law,
(e) unsupported by "substantial evidence",
(f) incomplete as to all issues requiring resolution by the agency,
(g) entered by persons subject to disqualification,
(h) inconsistent with an agency rule; or
(i) arbitrary or capricious.
130. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4)(c) (1994) such relief can be obtained if the
action is:
(i) unconstitutional,
(ii) outside the agency's authority,
(iii) arbitrary or capricious; or
(iv) taken by persons not properly entitled to take such action.
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(d) (1987).
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e)(1987). The legislature abandoned the
"substantial evidence" rule in 1967 and prescribed as a standard for judicial review the more strict
"clearly erroneous" concept. See Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 259-61, 461 P.2d 531, 533-
34 (1969). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.04.130(6)(e) (West Supp. 1967). Ironically, the
legislature's action created a situation where Washington reviewed judicial fact findings with the
"substantial evidence" standard and reviewed administrative fact findings with the "clearly
erroneous" standard, while federal courts applied the standards in the exact opposite manner.
More recent changes in the APA have returned to the "substantial evidence" standard, bringing
Washington into more uniformity with federal administrative procedure. See Sunset Provisions-
Administrative Procedure Act Revised, ch. 288, § 516, 1988 Wash. Laws 1386.
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(f) (1987).
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In contested cases, the standard of review for findings of fact was
whether the findings were "clearly erroneous" based on the record as a
whole. 34 For issues of law the standard of review was announced as
"error of law," which can usually be translated as de novo.13 5 Mixed
questions of law and fact were treated the same as issues of law.' 36
The Court of Appeals said that the standard of review in enforce-
ment cases differed from classic appellate review of agency decisions.
1 37
In enforcement cases, findings of fact were upheld if they were sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole;' 3 the
classic test considered only evidence in support of the finding.
139
Formerly, Washington's APA expressly stated that it was the
exclusive means for judicial review.140  Even so, Washington courts
held that review provisions of a specific statute would prevail if there
was a conflict with the APA and the specific statute had been passed
subsequent to the APA.14 1 The courts also held that judicial review of
administrative acts was available apart from the APA by writ of cer-
tiorari.142  Such writ may be either statutory'4 3 or constitutional.1
44
134. Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 324, 646 P.2d 113, 116 (1982). The
Sellers court said that WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.130(6)(e) was the applicable standard for agency
factual determinations. Id. That court also pointed out that a 1967 amendment to the
Administrative Procedure Act did away with the "substantial evidence" test, replacing it with the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Id.
135. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d at 325, 646 P.2d at 117. The court states: "Where an
administrative agency is charged with administering a special field of law and endowed with
quasi-judicial functions because of its expertise in that field, the agency's construction of statutory
words and phrases and legislative intent should be accorded substantial weight when undergoing
judicial review." Id. (quoting Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wash. 2d 552, 554-55,
637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981)). This substantial weight rapidly becomes insubstantial, as the
following sentence reads: "We also recognize the countervailing principle that it is ultimately for
the court to determine the purpose and meaning of statutes, even when the court's interpretation
is contrary to that of the agency charged with carrying out the law." Id. (quoting Overton).
136. Id. at 324, 646 P.2d at 119.
137. Highline Community College v. The Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 45 Wash. App. 803,
808, 727 P.2d 990, 993 (1986).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130 (1987) provided:
Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether such decision is
affirmative or negative in form, is entitled to judicial review thereof only under the
provisions of this 1967 amendatory act, and such person may not use any other
procedure to obtain judicial review of a final decision, even though another procedure is
provided elsewhere by a special statute or a statute of general application.
141. Public Employment Rel. Comm'n. v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 839, 664
P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983).
142. See State ex rel. DuPont-Ft. Lewis Sch. Dist. 7 v. Bruno, 62 Wash. 2d 790, 794, 384
P.2d 608, 610 (1963).
143. WAH. REV. CODE § 7.16.040 (1994). Washington courts have held that statutory
certiorari accords the petitioner full review of the issue raised, while constitutional certiorari is
limited to a review of the record to determine whether the decision or act complained of was or
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Washington's new APA has exclusivity language similar to that in the
former Act.14 Whether the language will be treated like that of the old
statute has yet to be judicially determined.
Having stated the appropriate standards of review for the various
types of issues, this Article turns to the standards themselves. It will
summarize and analyze the major standards applied at both the federal
and state levels. It will also discuss some of the exceptional standards
applied to due process, equal protection, the Washington Constitu-
tion's privileges and immunities clause, and to Washington damage
awards.
VII. THE STANDARDS
A. Abuse of Discretion
Conduct of court proceedings is generally left to the trial judge's
discretion and is therefore reviewed under the "abuse of discretion"
standard of review. 146 Primarily, discretion appears as the standard for
procedural rather than substantive rules.' 47 It governs rulings on most
motions, 141 objections, admissibility of evidence, criminal sentenc-
ing,' 49 and general conduct issues such as findings of contempt.5s
"Abuse of discretion" is usually the standard of review if phrases like
involved arbitrary and capricious or illegal actions, thus violating the petitioner's fundamental
rights to be free of such action. Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n for Sheriff's
Employees, 98 Wash. 2d 690, 693-94, 658 P.2d 648, 650-51 (1983).
144. WAsH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 6. The common law writ of certiorari embodied in the
constitution is distinguished from the statutory writ of review. The statute requires the superior
court to grant the writ only when four enumerated factors are present and accords the petitioner
full review of the issue raised. If any of the enumerated factors are absent, there is no jurisdiction
for review. The common law writ embodied in the constitution contains no such imperative. The
grant of common law certiorari is always discretionary with the court as part of its inherent
powers. Bridle Trails Community Club v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash. App. 248, 252, 724 P.2d
1110, 1112-13 (1986).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.510 (1994).
146. For a jurisprudential treatment of discretion, see RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977); Rosenberg, supra note 52.
147. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 653.
148. State v. Bebb, 44 Wash. App. 803, 723 P.2d 512 (1986) (continuance); State v. Haynes,
16 Wash. App. 778, 559 P.2d 583 (1977) (change of venue); Adkins v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 110 Wash. 2d 1287, 750 P.2d 1257 (1988) (mistrial); State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash. 2d
173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) (new trial; but note: a much stronger showing of an abuse of discretion
will ordinarily be required to set aside an order granting a new trial than one denying it); Johnson
v. Howard, 45 Wash. 2d 433, 275 P.2d 736 (1954) (discovery). A notable exception would be
motions for summary judgment.
149. State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wash. 2d 525, 530-31, 723 P.2d 1123, 1127 (1986) (citing
WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 51 (Jan.
1983)).
150. Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 34 Wash. App. 105, 660 P.2d 280 (1983).
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"the court may" or "for good cause" are involved.'-" However, this is
not always true.1S
2
The "abuse of discretion" standard is appropriate when (1) con-
cerns of judicial economy dictate that the trial court be responsible for
the decision, or (2) the trial judge is in a better position to make the
decision because he or she can observe the parties.'5 3  In an ongoing
trial, many factors interact and accumulate. For certain issues, interac-
tion among the entire panoply of factors is essential background for a
decision. This interaction cannot be entirely reflected in the record.
Because the trial judge is able to observe all the happenings at a trial
first hand, his or her decisions about such issues should be accorded
substantial deference. Logically, the less the need for "having been
there," the less deference should be accorded.
Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit argues that there is not just a
single static "abuse of discretion" standard.5- 4  The trial judge's dis-
cretion varies with the function. It may be more or less limited by
statute and/or court rule. Friendly says: "An appellate court must
carefully scrutinize the nature of the trial court's determination and
decide whether that court's superior opportunities of observation or
other reasons of policy require greater deference than would be
accorded to its formulations of law or its application of law to the facts.
In cases within the former categories, 'abuse of discretion' should be
given a broad reading, in others a reading which scarcely differs from
the definition of error."'5 5 The standard does not give nearly so com-
plete an immunity bath to the trial court's rulings as counsel for appel-
lees would have the reviewing court believe.' 6
"Abuse of discretion" has been defined as what happens when a
court's decision is "manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable
151. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 655.
152. Id.
153. State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wash. 2d 525, 542-43, 723 P.2d 1123, 1133 (1986).
154. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EMORY L. J. 747, 783 (1982).
155. Id. at 784.
156. Id. Professor Maurice Rosenberg also claims that there is more than a single
measurement. He, however, claims that there are two distinct kinds of discretion: primary and
secondary. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 637. With primary discretion, the judge had "a wide
range of choice as to what he decides, free from the constraints which characteristically attach
whenever legal rules enter the decision process." Id. Secondary discretion "comes into full play
when the rules of review accord the lower court's decision an unusual amount of insulation from
the appellate revision. In this sense, discretion is a review-restraining concept. It gives the trial
judge a right to be wrong without incurring reversal." Id. Professor Waltz argues that "guided"
and "unguided" discretion may be better labels. Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission
of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 N.W. U. L. REv. 1097, 1103 (1984/85).
Friendly's analysis of discretion as a continuum is more convincing with Rosenberg's "primary"
and "secondary" being merely points along that continuum.
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grounds, or for untenable reasons. '"157 An exercise of discretion by a
trial court may be erroneous without being illegal.15 ' Washington
courts have stated that "discretion is abused only where it can be said
no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court."' s9
Such a statement is at odds with Friendly's continuum analysis, partic-
ularly in cases where the standard would "scarcely differ from the defi-
nition of error."'161 Washington does acknowledge a range in
discretionary functions, however. For example, whether or not the trial
was by jury is often one factor used to determine the amount of defer-
ence that should be given. 6
Washington courts have been extremely reluctant to find abuse of
discretion. One of the few times a trial court was found to have abused
its discretion by excluding evidence, the court of appeals said that the
trial court could not deny a party the opportunity to present a crucial
link in his proof.' 62 In 1986, Justice Goodloe noted that only once
63
has a criminal sentence been ruled an abuse of discretion."
For some motions, the trial court is required to give definite find-
ings of law and facts in its order.'61 Not giving such reasons would in
itself be grounds for an appellate court to find the decision errone-
ous.1 66 However, for most motions at trial, no such requirement exists.
The procedure would be too time-consuming. Therefore, a reviewing
court often has an inadequate record with which to examine the trial
judge's decision.
Professor Rosenberg calls for a trial judge relying on discretionary
power to place on the record the circumstances and factors that were
crucial to his or her determination. 67 It is ironic, Rosenberg points
out, that if the court fails to do this, its chances of being affirmed are
better than if the record is spelled out.' 68 Based on the number of dis-
157. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash. 2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775, 784 (1971).
158. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 641 (citing Bringhurst v. Harkins, 32 Del. 324, 331, 122 A.
783, 787 (1923)). A discretionary decision should not be reversed if the reviewing court merely
disagrees with the decision, but rather only if "it appears that it was exercised on grounds, or for
reasons, clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." Id.
159. State v. Hurst, 5 Wash. App. 146, 148, 486 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1971).
160. Friendly, supra note 154, at 784.
161. See 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 14-2 (3d ed. 1989)
(and cases cited therein regarding evidentiary rulings).
162. Grigsby v. Seattle, 12 Wash. App. 453, 457, 529 P.2d 1167, 1170 (1975).
163. State v. Potts, 1 Wash. App. 614, 646 P.2d 742 (1969).
164. See State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash. 2d 547, 553, 723 P.2d 1111, 1115 (1986) (Goodloe,
J., dissenting).
165. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 59(0.
166. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 68 Wash. App. 201, 842 P.2d 494 (1992).
167. Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 665.
168. Id. at 666.
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cretionary decisions a judge makes in each case, placing everything in
the record could overencumber an already slow judicial process. A bet-
ter approach might be to let trial attorneys ask the court to place cir-
cumstances and factors in the record in certain instances. This would
limit additional recordmaking to only those discretionary decisions that
are most at issue.
Because "abuse of discretion" is usually the standard for proce-
dural issues, the typical remedy for finding an abuse is to reverse and
remand (unless the error is found to be harmless). This is done because
the reviewing court would have no way of knowing how the trial court
would have decided if the procedure had been different.
B. De Novo
The United States Supreme Court has said that de novo review
occurs when a "reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the
evidence to decide whether or not it believes [the conclusions of the
trial court]." '169 De novo review of the lower tribunal's record should
be distinguished from a trial de novo. The latter means a completely
new trial at which witnesses are heard and new evidence is taken. The
trial de novo is still used to review some determinations by agencies and
courts that are not of record.
The de novo standard of review applies to issues of law, to motions
for summary judgment, and, at times, to mixed questions of law and
fact.170 Washington courts have inverted the language at times, and
made statements like "the correct standard on review is error of
law."1 71 Correctly speaking, "error of law" is not a standard. It is a
classification of an issue. The standard is properly called de novo. This
is another example of the courts' imprecision in dealing with the con-
cept of standard of review.
The de novo standard is applied when the appellate court is in as
good a position as the trial court to judge the evidence. Because of this,
if all the relevant evidence is in documentary or deposition form, the
appellate court should be able to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court about facts as well as application. 172 Appellate courts can do
this in Washington. Some federal circuits followed this approach until
Civil Rule 52(a) was adopted making "clearly erroneous" the standard
169. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 466 U.S. 485, 514 n.31 (1984).
170. Johnson v. Employment Sec., 112 Wash. 2d 172, 175, 769 P.2d 305, 306 (1989).
171. See, e.g., Devine v. Employment Sec., 26 Wash. App. 778, 781, 614 P.2d 231, 233
(1980).
172. See, e.g., Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 19 Wash.
App. 397, 406, 577 P.2d 589, 594 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167
(1979).
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for all federal findings of fact, even if such findings are based solely on
documentary evidence.
Confusion arises because appellate courts reviewing cases de novo
sometimes speak of giving deference to lower tribunal's decisions even
though no deference is necessary. 113  Giving substantial weight to the
lower court's decision is not in accord with strict de novo review. Giv-
ing deference to the lower tribunal and reviewing de novo are, in fact,
contradictory.
C. Clearly Erroneous
The "clearly erroneous" standard is generally applied to findings
of fact. It recognizes the trial court's role as primary fact-finder and
prevents needless review of fact-findings on appeal."' The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure state that findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless they are "clearly erroneous." '  By contrast, Washington's
Court Rules do not announce a standard of review for factual findings;
and, facts found by trial courts are reviewed under the "substantial evi-
dence" standard. 176
According to the United States Supreme Court, a finding is
"clearly erroneous" when the reviewing court, in considering the entire
body of evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed, even though there is evidence to support
the lower court's finding. 177 Washington courts have said that under
the "clearly erroneous" test, the reviewing court may conduct a
broader, more intensive review than under the "substantial evidence"
test. 1 8 Theoretically, an appellate court could say: "I agree that a rea-
sonable person could make such a finding, but I think it clearly
wrong.' ' 179 The "clearly erroneous" standard is applied to the record as
a whole, rather than to the evidence of one party or the other. 80
Applying the "clearly erroneous" standard to findings of fact in
purely documentary cases is an excellent illustration of the illogic of
173. See, e.g., Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113, 117 (1982)
stating that the reviewing court may "essentially substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative body, though substantial weight is accorded the agency's view of the law").
174. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
176. See WAsH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 52. Factfinding is reviewed in Washington with the
"substantial evidence" test. See supra part Vi.A.
177. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
178. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 461 P.2d 531, 534 (1969). "Substantial
evidence" asks whether a reasonable person could draw the conclusion the trial court reached.
179. Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70, 81 (1944).
180. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d at 324, 646 P.2d at 116.
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rigidly applying standards rather than looking to the policies behind
them. Obviously, the appellate court is in as good of a position to eval-
uate the facts as the trial court in such instances. However, one United
States Supreme Court opinion can be interpreted as implying that the
"clearly erroneous" standard might be applied differently to different
types of cases.' After stating that the standard applies to non-jury
findings of fact whether based on witness credibility, on physical and
documentary evidence, or on inferences from other facts, the Court
said: "When findings are based on determinations regarding the credi-
bility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the
trial court's findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the varia-
tions in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the lis-
tener's understanding of and belief in what was said."' 18 2 Giving the
trial court "greater deference" makes for a more limited review of the
facts even though the same "clearly erroneous" standard was used.
The Bessemer City court also said that when a finding is based on a
decision to credit the testimony given by one of two or more witnesses,
each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not
contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally incon-
sistent, can virtually never be "clearly erroneous.
18 3
One commentator has gone so far as to say that "clearly errone-
ous" has no intrinsic meaning: "It is elastic, capacious, malleable, and
above all variable. Because it means nothing, it can mean anything and
everything that it ought to mean. It cannot be defined, unless the defi-
nition might enumerate a nearly infinite number of shadings along the
spectrum of working review standards."1 4  This adaptability, he
claims, is desirable.' It allows appellate courts the latitude to adapt
the measure of review to the shifting needs of different cases, different
laws, and different times. Factors to consider in the stringency of
review are the relative capacities of lower and higher tribunals, the need
for uniformity among cases, the perceived importance of the dispute,
and the nature of the legal rules involved. This analysis might be
extended to other, if not all, standards.
Examples of Washington cases in which fact-finding was judged
"clearly erroneous" are Swift v. Island County'8 6 and Hitchcock v.
181. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Cooper, supra note 58, at 645.
185. See id. at 670.
186. 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (holding that a determination of "no significant
impact" made pursuant to the State Environmental Policy Act by the county planning director
was "clearly erroneous").
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Department of Retirement Systems.1 87 In both of these cases, additional
considerations beyond the findings of fact themselves helped the courts
reach their decisions. In Swift, the court decided that the public policy
behind SEPA added additional weight to appellant's factual argu-
ments.188 In Hitchcock, the court found that the legislative intent of
liberal construction favored the appellant/beneficiaries.189 As these
cases illustrate, public policy and/or presumptions favoring the appeal-
ing parties may provide the extra quantum necessary for a finding of
"clearly erroneous."
Appellate courts often avoid the constraints imposed upon them
by the "clearly erroneous" standard by finding the issue under consid-
eration something other than one of pure fact.1 90
D. Arbitrary or Capricious
Despite the fact that most courts and commentators use the phrase
"arbitrary and capricious," the statutory standard they apply is "arbi-
trary or capricious." '191 "Arbitrary or capricious" is one of the stan-
dards used to review administrative decisions. "Arbitrary or
capricious" first became a recognized standard for judicial review of
administrative action when Congress passed the Administrative Proce-
dure Act in 1946.192 The phrase is included in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Acts of both the federal government193 and Washington. 194
The federal APA designates the "arbitrary or capricious" standard for
judicial review of informal agency actions and the "substantial evi-
187. 39 Wash. App. 67, 692 P.2d 834 (1984) (finding that the Department of Retirement
Systems' determination that payments made in lieu of transportation expenses were made for
personal services was "clearly erroneous").
188. Swift, 87 Wash.2d at 357-58, 552 P.2d at 181.
189. Hitchcock, 39 Wash. App. at 72, 692 P.2d at 838.
190. See Susan R. Petito, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact
Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 68, 87-90 (1977) (and cases cited therein).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988) says: "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law;". The "or" in the clause makes the standard arbitrary or
capricious. The Washington statute is more explicit. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.570(3)(i),
34.05.570(4)(b)(iii) (1992) both use the phrase "arbitrary or capricious." Because the arbitrary
and capricious language is often used in applying these statutes, "arbitrary and capricious" and
"arbitrary or capricious" can be considered synonymous for standard of review purposes even
though they otherwise would not appear so.
192. 5 DAVIS, supra note 2, § 29:6, at 354.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
194. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130 (1987).
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dence" standard, which is theoretically more rigorous, for review of for-
mal, record-producing agency actions."'
Washington courts have said that "arbitrary or capricious" means
"willful and unreasoning action, action without consideration and in
disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case." 196 Action is not
"arbitrary or capricious," even if an erroneous conclusion was reached,
when there is room for two opinions and an agency has acted honestly
and upon due consideration of the facts.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,1 97 the United States
Supreme Court said: "To make this finding [arbitrary or capricious]
the court must consider whether the decision was based on a considera-
tion of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment. 1 918 This passage gave birth to the "clear error of judgment"
language which has since been used by courts as a portion of the "arbi-
trary or capricious" standard. Some commentators and courts have
even treated it as a standard of review itself.199
The U.S. Supreme Court has also delineated certain circumstances
that would make an agency ruling "arbitrary or capricious." Normally,
an agency rule will be "arbitrary or capricious" if the agency has relied
on factors that Congress has not intended it to consider, has failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, or has offered an explana-
tion for its decision that either runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it can not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.200
In reviewing an administrative decision, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit announced that the "arbitrary or capricious" standard
may be applied differently to different issues in the same case.20 1 The
court stated that the scope of review of an agency's procedure and the
scope of review of the agency's discretion or policy are both governed
by the "arbitrary or capricious" standard. However, the court stated
that the scope of the judicial inquiry differs considerably, because
courts are experts on many problems of procedure while agencies may
be experts on many problems of discretion or policy within their areas
of specialization. 20 2 "In short, the concept of arbitrary and capricious
195. Matthew J. McGrath, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and
Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 541, at 541
(1986).
196. Sweitzer v. Industrial Ins. Comm., 116 Wash. 398, 401, 199 P. 724, 725 (1921).
197. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
198. Id. at 416.
199. See, e.g., 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 15.06 (and cases cited therein).
200. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
201. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
202. Id. at 1049-50.
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review defies generalized application and demands, instead, close atten-
tion to the nature of the particular problem faced by the agency.
' 20 3
Thus, another court wisely emphasizes the flexibility of yet another
standard.
The difference between the "clearly erroneous" standard and the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard was enunciated by the Washington
Supreme Court in Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n. v. King
County Council.2 4 The court said:
The "clearly erroneous" standard provides a broader review than the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard because it mandates a review of
the entire record and all the evidence rather than just a search for
substantial evidence to support the administrative finding or deci-
sion. Judicial review under the "clearly erroneous" standard set out
in RCW 34.04.130(6)(e) also requires consideration of the "public
policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the deci-
sion." Consequently, that public policy is "a part of the standard of
review.,205
E. Substantial Evidence
In Washington, the "substantial evidence" test is used to decide
whether or not to uphold a trial court's findings of fact.20 6 In federal
courts, "substantial evidence" is used only in reviewing factual deter-
minations by a jury.20 7 It is also the general test for reviewing adminis-
trative decisions at the federal level.208 Under the federal APA, the
"substantial evidence" standard applies to review of formal, record-
producing agency actions but not to informal rulemaking.20 9 Congress
has deviated from the APA model in a number of statutes, however, by
mandating the use of the "substantial evidence" standard for review of
informal agency actions.21° As a result of this additional application ofthe standard, at least some courts and commentators have suggested
203. Id. at 1050. The Natural Resources court adds in a footnote that such a focus on the
particular problem would appear to hold true for standards other than "arbitrary and capricious"
review. Id. at n.24.
204. 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
205. Id. at 274-75, 552 P.2d at 678-79 (citations omitted).
206. Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck, 96 Wash. 2d 716, 719, 638 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1982).
207. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
208. ICC v. Louisville & N. R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 94 (1913).
209. McGrath, supra note 195, at 541.
210. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(b)(4) (1988);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, § 6(f), 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1988).
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that the "arbitrary or capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards
have converged at the federal administrative level.
"Substantial evidence" has been interpreted as evidence in suffi-
cient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
212th edeclared premise. When the evidence conflicts, a reviewing court
must determine only whether or not the evidence most favorable to the
prevailing party supports the challenged findings.213 An appellate
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even
though it might have resolved the factual dispute differently.21 4 Courts
rarely find that there is not "substantial evidence" to support a
decision.215
The United States Supreme Court says:
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than
create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. "It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion," and it must be enough to justify,
if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the con-
clusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.216
"Substantial evidence" has also been interpreted to mean that the deci-
sion had "warrant in the record" and "a reasonable basis in law." 217
An appellate court cannot set aside a finding or verdict merely because
it would have reached a different conclusion itself.218
The "substantial evidence" standard will vary depending upon the
quantum of proof required for the point at issue.2  Evidence that is"substantial" enough to support a "preponderance of evidence" burden
211. See McGrath, supra note 195, at 553 (citing Scalia & Goodman, supra note 124, at 935,
n.138; Pacific Legal Found. v. Department of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.35 (D.C. Cir), cert.
denied 444 U.S. 830 (1979); and other cases).
212. Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash. 2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621, 624 (1978).
213. State v. Black, 100 Wash. 2d 793, 802, 676 P.2d 963, 969 (1984). But see Stern, supra
note 179, at 77.
214. Beeson v. Arco, 88 Wash. 2d 499, 503, 563 P.2d 822, 824 (1977). But see Arnold v.
Sanstol, 43 Wash. 2d 94, 260 P.2d 327 (1953) (finding a lack of "substantial evidence" because the
conclusion drawn was not the only one that could fairly and reasonably be drawn).
215. But see McGovern v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 94 Wash. 2d 448, 617
P.2d 434 (1980) (four Justices dissenting). The Court in McGovern merely makes a single
conclusory statement: ". . . here there is no substantial evidence that the facility is other than
temporary." Id. at 451, 617 P.2d at 437. See also Olien v. Department of Labor & Indus., 74
Wash. App. 566, 874 P.2d 876 (1994). Although this case never mentions "substantial evidence"
as the standard, it reverses the trial court's findings of fact as being unsupported by the evidence.
Id.
216. NLRB v. Columbian, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (citations omitted).
217. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).
218. Stern, supra note 179, at 89.
219. In re Sego, 82 Wash. 2d 736, 739, 513 P.2d 831, 833 (1973).
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of proof may not support a "clear, cogent, and convincing" burden.220
Although some commentators contend that such heightened analysis
does not extend to review of criminal cases,2 2 1 some. courts do give
more scrutiny to fact-findings in such cases. 22 Opinions give no indi-
cation of any difference in the meaning of "substantial evidence" as
applied by appellate courts than as applied by trial courts (as in a
motion for a judgment nonwithstanding verdict).223
As previously stated, "substantial evidence" is one of the stan-
dards for reviewing federal administrative agency actions. 224 The fed-
eral standard differs from the state standard, however, because the
statute dictates that it be applied to the record as a whole.225 Prior to
passage of the federal APA, courts reviewed only the evidence that sup-
ported the agency action. 226  To rectify this one-sided scrutiny, Con-
gress required that courts consider the "whole record" when reviewing
agency action.227 Even though some state decisions use the "record as
a whole" language,228 the rule at common law and the rule usually
stated today requires "substantial evidence" viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.2 29 Courts have interpreted this to
220. In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wash. 2d 623, 640, 479 P.2d 1, 11 (1970); In re Sego, 82 Wash.
2d at 739, 513 P.2d at 833. However, some lower courts have refused to follow this type of
application in certain circumstances. See In re Ott, 37 Wash. App. 234, 237 n.2, 679 P.2d 372,
374-75 n.2 (1984).
221. WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON APPELLATE PRACTICE
HANDBOOK § 5-3 (1980).
222. See, e.g., State v. Green, 94 Wash. 2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628, 632 (1980) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Cirginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979)). "[T]he critical inquiry on
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be ... to determine
whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. The court then elaborated on that test: "[T]he relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Jachson, 443 U.S. at 318). The result has been that, instead of using the
phraseology of a single logical system (i.e., saying that the standard of review is "substantial
evidence" being applied to the burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt"), later courts have
treated the Green phraseology as an entirely new standard unrelated to all others. See, e.g., State v.
Aver, 109 Wash. 2d 303, 310-11, 745 P.2d 479, 482-83 (1987).
223. See Trautman, supra note 76, at 803 n.65 (1967).
224. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
225. See id.
226. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478 (1951).
227. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
228. See, e.g., Public Employment Rel. Comm'n. v. Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 842, 664
P.2d 1240, 1244 (1983) (an administrative decision looking to federal law for guidance).
229. Bennett v. Department of Labor & Indus., 95 Wash. 2d 531, 534, 627 P.2d 104, 106
(1981).
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mean that only the evidence favoring the prevailing party's case need
be looked at in such determination.
2 30
Justice Scalia (while a member of the D.C. Circuit) distinguished
the "substantial evidence" standard from the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard by considering the circumstances where the standards
apply.23' He said that the "arbitrary or capricious" standard applies to
whatever the agency had before it when it acted, regardless of whether
the information was shown to or known by the parties in the proceed-
ing.232 The "substantial evidence" standard, by contrast, applies only
to a confined body of evidence (within the record of closed-record pro-
ceedings). 233 Thus, the "arbitrary or capricious" standard operates on a
broader base. Another possible distinction which can be made is that
the "substantial evidence" standard applies to factual determinations
while "arbitrary or capricious" goes to the entire process of the admin-
istrative action (including, but not limited to, factual determinations).
One problem that has arisen in applying the "substantial evi-
dence" and "arbitrary or capricious" standards illustrates the problems
inherent in applying any standard of review. Crucial to any application
is a delineation of exactly what the standard is being applied to. "The
record considered as a whole" need not be elaborated. It includes all
testimony and evidence in the lower tribunal's record. However,
problems arise when language such as "in a light most favorable to
[one of the parties]" is used. Does this language mean to look at the
entire record and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party?
Or does it mean to look only at the parts of the record that support that
party, ignoring entirely any contradictory evidence or testimony?
Courts have interpreted the same phrase in both of these ways. 234 For
other standards, like "clearly erroneous," the appellate court looks
beyond the record to considerations such as legislative policy.
F. Other Standards
In addition to the preceding "major" standards of review, the
courts have created other standards for certain types of cases or issues.
Examples include the standards developed for federal equal protection
230. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 208, 212, 716 P.2d 911,
914 (1986).
231. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
232. Id. at 684.
233. Id.
234. Compare Conversions and Surveys v. Department of Revenue, 11 Wash. App. 127, 521
P.2d 1203 (1974) (looking at the entire record) with Hall v. Puget Sound Bridge and Dry Dock, 66
Wash. 2d 442, 403 P.2d 41 (1965) (disregarding contradictory evidence).
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and state privileges and immunities review and the standard for review-
ing damage awards in Washington.
There are essentially three standards of review applied by federal
courts to equal protection cases. They are the two traditional stan-
dards: "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis"; and a third intermediate
test: "substantial relationship."
"Strict scrutiny" is one of the tests available under a constitutional
equal-protection analysis.2"' It is used if a classification attacked as
discriminatory under the equal protection clause involves either a "sus-
pect class" or a "fundamental right" explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.236 When "strict scrutiny" is involved, the classifi-
cation will be upheld only if the state can justify it by showing a com-
pelling state interest.237
The "rational basis" test is another standard of review for equal
protection. It applies to equal protection under the federal Constitu-
tion and privileges and immunities under the state constitution.238 The
two requirements of the test are (1) a classification must apply alike to
all members within the designated class, and (2) reasonable grounds
must exist for making a distinction between those falling within the
class and those falling outside of it.239
There is also at least one intermediate equal-protection test that
falls somewhere between the other two.240  It has been formally
adopted for gender and illegitimacy cases. Under this standard, the
classification must have a "substantial relationship" to an important
governmental interest. 24 1 The standards for equal protection and sub-
stantive due process have been exhaustively treated elsewhere,24 2 how-
ever, and will not be discussed further in this Article.
The same approach to standard of review has been used by Wash-
ington courts in construing the state Constitution's privileges and
235. State v. Rice, 98 Wash. 2d 384, 399, 655 P.2d 1145, 1153 (1982).
236. Id.
237. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
238. See Housing Authority of King County v. Saylors, 87 Wash. 2d 732, 738-39, 557 P.2d
321, 325 (1976).
239. Griffin v. Department of Social and Health Servs., 91 Wash. 2d 616, 627, 590 P.2d 816,
823 (1979).
240. See JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 576 (4th ed. 1991).
241. Id.
242. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 16 (2d ed. 1988);
NOWAK, supra note 240, at ch. 14 (and articles cited therein).
[Vol. 18:11
Standard of Review
immunities clause,2 43 although the potential for a different analysis has
been hinted at by Justice Utter.244
These standards differ from the standards previously discussed in
that they are applied to action taken by administrative or state entities
rather than to decisions rendered by the courts. This distinction makes
them difficult to compare with other standards.
Another unique standard has been used to review damage awards
in Washington. Damages can be reduced or the award vacated if they
are "unmistakably ... the result of passion or prejudice." 245 Unfortu-
nately, this entirely new standard is not the only one for reviewing
damages. Absent a showing of passion or prejudice, appellate courts
still may review the adequacy or inadequacy of a damage award.
Although stating this proposition in Malstrom v. Kalland,24 6 the Wash-
ington Supreme Court failed to articulate a standard for such review
(the court did manage to decide the case even without a standard, how-
ever). Almost ten years later, Division Three of the Court of Appeals
announced a standard for review of damages absent a showing of pas-
sion or prejudice. 47 The test is whether the verdict "shocks the con-
science, sense of justice and sound judgment of the appellate court. '24
The court cited no authority for this standard which, ignoring any fact/
law classification, appears unrelated to any other standard of review. A
still later Court of Appeals decision states: "It is well established that
an appellate court will not disturb a jury award supported by 'substan-
tial evidence'. ' 249  The Supreme Court has combined the standards,
announcing that Washington courts will not disturb an award of dam-
ages made by a jury unless it (1) is outside the range of "substantial
evidence" in the record, (2) shocks the conscience, or (3) appears to
have been arrived at as the result of passion or prejudice.250
The issue of damage awards illustrates Washington's inability to
come to grips with standard of review. California fits damage awards
243. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
244. See Matter of Mota, 114 Wash. 2d 465, 472, 788 P.2d 538, 542 (1990). The criteria to
be used in making such an argument are listed in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720
P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986).
245. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 59(a)(5); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.76.030 (1992). The
creation of new standards is an unfortunate consequence of the legislature crossing into a field
normally reserved for the courts.
246. 62 Wash. 2d 732, 736-38, 384 P.2d 613, 616 (1963).
247. Curtiss v. YMCA, 7 Wash. App. 98, 104, 498 P.2d 330, 334 (1972), aff'd, 82 Wash.
2d 455, 511 P.2d 991 (1973).
248. Id.
249. Alpine Indus., Inc. v. Gohl, 30 Wash. App. 750, 758, 637 P.2d 998, 1003, opinion
changed, 645 P.2d 737 (1981) (the damage award here was said to "slightly exceed" the maximum
amount supported by the evidence).
250. Rasor v. Retail Credit, 87 Wash. 2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976).
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into the general scheme of standard of review by treating the amount of
damages as a finding of fact. A California appellate court does not
weigh the evidence on damages and will reverse a judgment on appeal
only if no "substantial evidence" supports the award.2"' Other courts
also treat the damages as a question of either fact 2 2 or law.25 3
The above examples do not exhaust the universe of "other stan-
dards." Even if they did, considering the courts' propensity for sponta-
neously generating standards of review, there will probably be
additional standards in the future. The above merely illustrate the fact
that the standards discussed in this article will not encompass review of
every issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are many standards of appellate review. They have evolved
over the course of several centuries; and each has evolved somewhat
independently of all the others. The result for anyone looking at the
big picture is a state of confusion.
The language used to define different standards often refers to dif-
ferent components of the decision/review process (e.g., "substantial
evidence" in the record as opposed to "abuse of discretion" by the deci-
sionmaker). This makes comparison between standards difficult.
Interpretation of the standards has done little, if anything, to clarify
matters.
The real problem with standards of review, critics argue, is that
they have been applied inconsistently. The critics are undoubtedly cor-
rect. However, this does not mean that the process as it exists should
be scrapped. Too much intelligent consideration has gone into the sys-
tem as it exists. Nor does the answer lie in further definition of terms.
Previous elaborations have often resulted in additional standards. That
will not solve the problem; if anything, it will add to it.
A better approach is to recognize the flexible nature of standards
(as well as of words themselves, which define standards) and take
advantage of that flexibility. Attorneys should argue and courts should
decide the amount of deference to accord a lower tribunal decision by
focusing on policy considerations: Is demeanor of witnesses important
to the case? Does the lower tribunal have particular expertise in the
area? Were there factors outside the record that weighed on the finding
251. Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 143 n.28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
252. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Bengal Marine, Inc., 857 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1988).
253. See, e.g., In re American Cas. Co., 851 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Michigan
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or determination? If so, an appellate court should give greatly
increased deference to the trial court.
For those who prefer a black-or-white, easy-to-apply standard,
such a process is discomforting. However, there are no easy answers to
many questions about standard of review. It is much more forthright
and intellectually sound to confront the issues on a policy level than to
obfuscate the review process with more boilerplate nomenclature fol-
lowed by more unexplained application.
